

12 OCTOBER (Acting DCI)

1. Met with Senator Saltonstall at 1145 upon the Senator's request, giving him a world wrap-up. Messrs. Sheldon and Warner accompanied. Per M/R, dated 15 October, re briefing of Senator Stennis on that date, "our conversation centered almost entirely on the Soviet buildup in Cuba and I brought him up to date in specific detail as I did with Senator Saltonstall."
2. Went to see Mr. McGeorge Bundy at 1245 since (per 12 October Memo attached under 11 October) I was not quite clear as to exactly what kind of flights the President had authorized.
3. First and second telephone conversations with General McKee concerning U-2 jurisdiction. Also telecons this date with Secretary Gilpatric, McGeorge Bundy, General Taylor, and Alexis Johnson. (Attached)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2005

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(b) (3)

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LAST MONTH

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OCTOBER—1962						
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NEXT MONTH

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8:45	Dentist - 4th fl. cleaned	1:00
9:00	Int'l. Ref.	1:15
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11:00		3:15
11:15	Leave for 4th fl.	3:30
11:30		3:45
11:45	meeting w/ Sen. Saltwaterfall	4:00
12:00	(with wren. up)	4:15 Ed Roth
12:15	1102 New Senate Office Bldg	4:30 Cunningham, Scott
12:30		4:45 John D. Roth
12:45	McGeorge Bundy	5:00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Overflights of Cuba

1. Yesterday morning in a meeting with Mr. McCone, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Cunningham, and myself, it was decided that in connection with reconnaissance overflights of Cuba, if the operation were to be covert, then it would be flown by the CIA under existing procedures, i.e., Lockheed aircraft with Lockheed pilot on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico. If the operation were to be overt, then the mission would be flown by U. S. Air Forces pilot in uniform in the U-2 aircraft plainly marked with Air Force markings. A telephone conversation during this meeting between Mr. McCone and Mr. Gilpatric was not resolved and Mr. McCone instructed me to get the matter resolved along the foregoing lines with Secretary Gilpatric.

2. Yesterday afternoon I met with Secretary Gilpatric and he said he had turned the problem over to General McKee (Vice Chief of the Air Force) and that I should work it out with General McKee; that failing this, I should then see General Taylor and that, failing this, I should return to Secretary Gilpatric. I then met with General McKee, General Strother (Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations), and two staff officers of the Air Force. After a lengthy discussion (but not heated), it was agreed that if the operation were to be purely overt, then SAC should fly it as an Air Force reconnaissance mission. If it were purely covert, then CIA should continue to fly it as a clandestine operation. The problem of an in-between overt/covert operation was not discussed nor was it anticipated. In connection with the qualifications of the pilots, General McKee directed that the SAC pilots immediately start training under CIA procedures to ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence (as distinct from CIA) could be assured that this first mission under the new hazards would be as well done as possible. The problem of just how much training would be necessary was left unresolved but flexible since weather seemed to be the controlling factor. The matter of operational control of the mission, and disposition of the film, was not raised.


3. This morning I stopped by Mr. Gilpatric's office to assure myself that he was satisfied with my agreement with General McKee. He was not. He stated that he thought the President had clearly approved military overflights, and that therefore SAC was ready to go ahead with them. I told him that the pilot was still being checked out by us in the J-75's and that we were not sure when he would be ready but, in any event, weather would prevent our making the flight before Sunday morning. I told him that I hoped that by that time the pilot would be current. Mr. Gilpatric said that the general consensus at Special Group was that the old cover story for the CIA operation was now too thin to hold water and that therefore the President had decided that the military should conduct the reconnaissance. He then said that the cover story in the event of difficulty would be that the pilot was conducting peripheral reconnaissance and had blown off course. I told him that this simply would not hold water and that if this was a cover story, then the operation appeared to be covert and the President had not in fact decided to authorize military overflights. We argued this point back and forth without results until he was called to see Mr. McNamara about other matters. He told me that he had talked to General McKee and that they had agreed that the operational control of the mission must be exercised through the CIA long-established procedures for these overflights. In other words, the aircraft would have Air Force markings with an Air Force pilot but the operational and command procedures for conduct of the mission would be handled by the established CIA communications network and operations room with the weather decision, go-no-go decision, etc., to be by CIA. (This I consider essential for the first few missions or at least until SAC has developed and established a capability for conduct of this operational control commensurate with that presently existing based on the 60-odd successful missions CIA has already flown.)

4. Since I was not quite clear as to exactly what kind of flights the President had authorized, I discussed the matter with Mr. McGeorge Bundy at noon. He stated that the President of course had not, repeat not, approved overt military flights over Cuba -- that the U. S. Government could not, repeat not, stand up and say that they were violating Cuban national borders of their own free will and without impunity; what the President really felt was that it would be easier to live with a

possible accident if we simply stated that this was a routine peripheral military reconnaissance flight and that we deny any violation of the borders. Certainly this is now, under current conditions, a better cover story than the Lockheed ferry trip. Mr. Bundy likewise agreed that the operational control and the command channels should be the ones presently operated by CIA. Mr. Bundy indicated urgency in getting the initial flight accomplished as quickly as possible and stated that if the SAC pilot was not ready by Sunday and the weather was ready for a Sunday flight, then we should fly it Lockheed all the way.

5. This afternoon I received a call from Mr. Gilpatric stating that he had just met with Zuckert, Charyk, Power, and McKee who all felt that the SAC pilot was ready to go and could make the flight on Sunday if the weather was right. I told him that our people were not quite agreed to this but were heavily engaged in checking the pilot out to get him ready just as quickly as possible, that I hoped this would be on Sunday and, in any event, unless something most unusual happens, he would be ready on Monday.

Dictated by General Carter on 12 Oct 62



~~TOP SECRET~~

15 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCONE

1. Attached are the basic papers with reference to the weekend discussions on Cuban overflights. I invite your particular attention, if you have time, to the telephone conversations which are roughly transcribed. We are cleaning them up, but this will give you a flavor of just what happened.

2. You have already read the three papers at the back but I give them to you anyway for further background.



Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA

Attachments

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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 General McKee on Friday, 12 October
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 control Cuban overflights
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- TAB L Copy of Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from General Carter,
 Subject: Command and Control Responsibility for Cuban U-2
 Reconnaissance, dated 13 October 1962
- TAB M Copy of Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
 the Acting Director of Central Intelligence from McGeorge Bundy
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
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- 3 -

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~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - conversation
McKee
Zed.
B

Conversation between General Carter and General McKee
Friday, 12 October 1962

General Carter - Can you hear me?

General McKee - I just barely can hear you. How're you doing?

C - I'm doing fine. I think we've got this thing all on the tracks. I don't know.

M - Well, I just talked to General Taylor and to Gilpatric and to Charyk and a few other people. Fortunately, Tommy Power was in and he's been completely briefed. He's talked to Gilpatric and Taylor. He knows what his responsibilities are loud and clear. He's talked to his people and he sees no problem as of now. We sent him a message and I told our people to furnish you a copy of the message sent to him, so it would seem to me that things are reasonably well on the track.

C - Well, I hope they are. ^{talked} I ~~told~~ to Gilpatric this morning and things were fairly well on the track when I left although I wasn't too understanding as to just what the decision was that the President made. However, I did get it loud and clear from Mr. Gilpatric that the operation of the mission would be under the operational control procedures that presently exist over here and which we've been doing for the last two years plus. I did not discuss with him the disposition of the take but I would presume the most logical thing would be to keep it in the same procedure. I then talked to Bundy....

M - The take will ~~be~~, obviously, as heretofore, go to you. As far as-- I'm not clear on your control procedures, but, obviously, command of control has to be under Power if he's going to be responsible. That doesn't mean he won't use procedures. I'd think that would all be very closely tied in together. Do you follow me?

C - Well, yuh, I follow you except I have trouble fitting the facilities into what's required. In other words, if....

M - Well look--we can talk too much. Col. Geary will be over at your office. He has an appointment with you at 4:00. He said he was going to see you at four, so I guess he called up your office. Be sure that there's no misunderstanding anyplace, and he's totally knowledgeable, he's been in the business for years and years and years, and knows every detail of this, so if there are any questions in your mind, any you possibly have...

C - Well, there are big questions in my mind right now, unfortunately, because Mr. Gilpatric assured me that this particular one was real critical as did Mr. Bundy, and they didn't want anything screwing it up and we better just keep it operating under the system which has been operating on for so long and with such success. I told Mr. Gilpatric that under an orderly transition, there was no reason at all why eventually we couldn't switch the system over, but I felt very strongly, not as Director of Central Intelligence, but as Director--- I mean, not as Director of the Agency but as Acting Director of Central Intelligence, that the less we do to upset the normal operating procedures under these circumstances until we get a real reason, the better off we are.

M - I don't know what is involved here

C - There's a whole hell of a lot involved here. This is a tremendous communications problem and a tremendous support problem, really, which SAC has not been doing up to now and which we have been doing for two years and have done over 60 of them successfully, and I guess this midnight transition just frightens the b'Jeezez out of me. There's nothing jurisdictional here, at least I hope there isn't, from my viewpoint.

M - Well, Pat, after your conversation with Geary... obviously, we have to work together, use your resources and whatnot, and communications, I would think, that are set up. We can't start from scratch, we know that, but I am sure that Geary will be able to clear up any doubts in your mind.

C - Well, I'm not sure, and to be perfectly frank, unless Geary has the authority to make the decisions, there's not much sense in my talking to him. I've been dealing with Gilpatric and he has assured me that the operational control will remain in the current channels. Now what this means is that constant, almost by-the-minute communications between my people in three different places and between SAC weather, and constant communication control of the operation from start to finish through people who are on my payroll--95% of them are Air Force's--but they are on my payroll and they're in bed with the contracted personnel and they have all the spare parts and they have everything else. Now, it just doesn't make sense to me to completely disrupt this operation overnight. Now, if you want General Power to come over and sit in the operations room here and make these decisions during the next 72 hours, and we start 36 hours ahead, why that's all

right, but aside from that it seems to me that the logical thing to do in order to get a proper mission is to put the boy in the aircraft and let him fly it in accordance with the procedures that we've been doing for, as I say, two years--61 missions so far without a problem. But, under the new arena that we're operating in, to switch this thing overnight to an entirely different command control system, just doesn't make sense to me. I'm talking now as Director of Central Intelligence (Acting) rather than... We're delighted to get out of the overt operations, I assure you, and we're not being bureaucratic in this thing at all, but Mr. McCone and I have one hell of a responsibility to make certain that this transition is orderly and gives us the type of intelligence we need.

M - Well, we all want that.

C - I should sure hope so.

M.- We certainly have got to work together to that end to get the best operation we possibly can.

C - I should sure hope so there. Again, if you interject General Power in it you've got one complete more headquarters involved which has not been in the act at all except to furnish weather. Now, as I say, 95% of the people who are running these things are SAC people, so it looks to me like its a jurisdictional, bureaucratic problem that we're faced with over there.

M - Well, let me get ahold of our people and see what the hell is involved, but you ought to go ahead and talk to Geary anyway.

C - Well, I'll talk to Geary, but I'm totally disenchanted with talking to a staff officer who doesn't have any authority to make a decision. This is my problem, and he can't reassure me, no matter what he says, that SAC has in existence any system anywhere comparable to what we've been using for the past two years. They couldn't possibly have done it on 72 hours notice. Now, I have other problems involving the individual safeguards for the personnel involved, which I think I ought to talk to somebody about. We're getting some awful funny answers out of the Air Force as to the six qualified people that we got who have been doing this for the last two years, and so far as I know nobody has given any consideration to this poor devil that you're going to lock into this machine--as to his future if anything happens to him and as to his family and his benefits and insurance

and everything else because of the peculiar mission that he is involved in, and we have some cases right now of entirely different type operations, but the results have been the same, and it's real frightening what can happen to a guy when he's doing something without a corporation backing him up -- am I getting through?

M - Yuh.

C - Now this worries me and it worries me not because it has any connection with the Agency, but because there's another ramification which in the urgency of getting something done here does not seem to have been considered by anyone, at least I can't find anyone who knows what happens to this guy if he gets killed and what happens to his family, because no insurance company is going to pay off on it. As I say, we have some cases like that which are in existence right now, you see, so there's so damn much that's unbuttoned on this thing still that I am almost inclined to say, well, let's take a better risk and take one of my boys and put him in a blue suit and hope nothing happens. I don't know. But, it seems to me we're really doing this thing without getting it thoroughly thought out.

M - Well, let me check on this and.

C - Yuh, I sure will, but I say again, I'll talk to your fellow Geary, but there's no point in my arguing with him and telling him my thoughts like I'm telling you because all he can do is carry them back to Newcastle.

McKee: ~~31~~²⁴ Conversation
Friday
=

General Carter - Yes sir!

General McKee - I have talked to our people and have just hung up the phone in talking to SAC, the guy up there who runs the whole business, and it is my considered judgment that your fears are unfounded. The fact is, my God, we're doing this all over the world. We control our airplanes worldwide. This is just another mission we have submitted which they had some time ago a detailed operational plan in the minutest detail, which they always do. They don't see what the problem is, and these guys are in big-time business in the flying business of all kinds of sources and descriptions and all kinds of airplanes and they just don't understand what the problem is.

C - They really don't?

M - They don't...and they do this all the time. They....

C - SAC doesn't own a single U-2 with J-75's in it, not a single one...

M - So what the hell difference does that make.

C - It makes a hell of a lot of difference in flight planning, in altitude control, in everything. It's entirely different engines.....

M - The guys get checked out on that.

C - The guy, the pilot is, but your people who are operating it don't know a damn thing about it. Now maybe in a week we can train them, maybe.....

M - We disagree with that, Pat.

C - Well, I'm not talking from CIA viewpoint. I'm talking from the overall problem of let's get this first few, when it's so critical, done by the pros who have been doing it for two years and have done over 61 of them, and let's get it and get an orderly transition into the deal. We're not trying to hang onto a capability that we don't want to release. 95% of these people are already SAC people. Why institute a complete new chain of command, and new operational controls under something just because you've changed one pilot, you see?

M -

M - Look, Pat, I want to make my position clear. If we're going to have our guy in this and run this operation this way, then from an Air Force point of view we insist on exercising command and control instead of having this split responsibility. Now, if you don't buy that, as far as I'm concerned, then I get out of play and say that you run the whole damn thing. Power will never buy this split responsibility because he's ready, and Power had so stated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he's ready, willing and able and can do. I just checked with this guy that's been in the middle of it who says exactly the same thing, but they cannot accept this split responsibility.

C - Well, I don't get the point where the split responsibility is.

M - Well, the split responsibility is that if they're responsible for the mission and you command the control, who the hell holds the sack. There's always a sack to be held.

C - Sure, there's always a sack to be held and we're entirely agreeable to holding the sack until we get the transition to where SAC.....

M - Well, what you're saying--what you're now proposing--is that you all go ahead and run the thing until you all are satisfied that they're ready to do it.

C - Well, substantially that, although all I'm saying is that we have in being a communications system, a procedure that we've been activating week after week over a period of over two years.

M - Well, now look, Pat, as far as the communications, we have far more elaborate communications in SAC than you do, and what we're doing is, we've got a target. It doesn't make any difference if we practice precision on targets all over the damn place all the time and this is just another one, so there's nothing strange or unusual about this.

C - Well, SAC hasn't flown a flight in that area since we've been in business on this.

M - What difference does it make whether it's that area or some other area? I mean you're up in the air where the hell ever you are and you hit points all over, and they do it all over the world so.....

C - Yup, and we have all those procedures established as to exactly how you develop the points and everything else, and an operations room over here manned by SAC people, 95% of them, running this thing daily.

M - Well, my God, they've got the world's biggest operations center at SAC.

C - Yup, and they've got thousands of airplanes also which they're worried about and in this particular area, we have just one airplane we're worried about.

M - Well, then, see, SAC is just worried about this one too because he's taking charge. But we either got to leave him in charge of it or else you all take it over, one or the other. And, I've talked to Gilpatric and I've talked to Taylor, and they agree with this line of reasoning, and I don't know what else we can do because I just can't ask Power, but he wouldn't do it anyway because he takes his orders on this from Taylor, not from me, and Taylor quite agrees with Power and so stated.

C - Well, what are you telling Power to do then--to go ahead and run the show?

M - Yup.

C - Well, then, who's telling us to give the airplane to Power?

M - Well..

C - And the ground control equipment and all the spare parts. SAC doesn't even have a spare sparkplug for this aircraft.

M - Well, we assume that that's being worked out with your people. The fact is we've got two airplanes out there for exactly that purpose.

C - Yup. Who's planning the missions? Who's going to decide go or no go?

M - SAC.

C - The procedures, they don't even have an operations room for this type of thing. I don't know, Bozo, maybe I am fighting the problem. Maybe I'm really fighting the problem.

M - What in the hell's the matter with their operations room that.... They've got a global operations room at SAC headquarters, biggest in the world.

C - Yuh, they sure as hell have and if they're going to control one airplane from that global operations room then they better go buy themselves another one. We've got an operations room right here with communications, direct, immediate, compelling. We've got Geary's information before he gets it, with the sole purpose of running this one aircraft on this one extremely important mission. I hate to see it get thrown into the other 10,000 aircraft that are wandering around loose.... until we get the transition reasonably organized. Now, maybe I'm fighting the problem. This poor guy gets a cold --you're out of business. The extra guy who's already down there has already got a cold. He's DNIF, so if this guy gets a cold nothing happens.

M - Well, what you're saying is that y'all ought to run the whole damn thing and we should never have gotten into it in the first place.

C - No, I'm not. I'm not, Bozo, I'm saying that if we're going to have a transition into this operation then let's do it reasonably well so that our first few missions which are so important now, I think, are done with the greatest possible competence and not on what I think is a -- what I consider-- a flash basis, that's all. That's all, we're not fighting the problem of turning it over ^{to} the military; if it's going to be an overt operation, if they're prepared to accept that if anything goes wrong, yes, it was military, then we want out, but we want out from Central Intelligence Agency standpoint but as Director of Central Intelligence I want out with as orderly a process as possible so we don't run the least possible chance of bugging up this first, most important one. This is all.

M. - Well, I can understand your concern. However, it seems to us that looking at the timing, looking at the background and looking at the problem that this can be done and done effectively and efficiently and we feel confident that this can be done. Now, I didn't make the decision--I could care less--I didn't make the decision in the first place. This is made by top level authorities that we were to do it, and if we're going to do it, God damn it, I say let's do it, and let's assume full responsibility for it.

C - Yuh, well the only reason I called you was because Gilpatric told me that he had not decided it that way and that if there was any question to call you.

M - Well, I just told Gilpatric that we were not in a.. after all my other conversations.. that we ~~xx~~ were not in a position to have command and control rest with you all and responsibility of performance of the mission rest with us. That it was divided responsibility and that Power would not accept that and in my humble opinion that whoever does it ought to do the

whole damn thing and bear the brunt of whatever occurs, and for your information, with all the yakking I've been doing and whatnot, that'll be McKee, so I'm looking for a little--~~a~~nice little--hut up in _____ here, if anything goes wrong.

C - Well, I don't blame you. The trouble is SAC isn't in a position to assume the full responsibility because we're responsible for making the aircraft operational. Now, if SAC is going to fly in a crew there to take care of the J-75 and pick it up and get it tuned up and make damn sure it's ready to go.....

M - We certainly expect assistance from you in that regard--on ground support. That still doesn't leave you holding the bag.

C - No? The hell it doesn't. That airplane gets up and falls apart, it's... SAC isn't going to say, Jesus, we buggered it up. They're going to say, well, Christ, we looked to CIA to get that airplane flyable and here we've lost one of our best pilots because the thing fell apart.

M - Well, we won't do that.

C - Oh, Bozo, you know God damn well that's going to be the reaction, just the same as if we take your pilot and we fly the mission and something goes wrong, we can't say it publicly, but we can sure say, well, God damn it, if you'd let us do it with one of our six pilots, it wouldn't have been that way.

M - You'd probably say it publicly.

C - No, SAC says things publicly. CIA doesn't say a God damn thing as you know.

M - Well, I've been in this business for nine years, supporting other people and whatnot, and _____ services, and I don't think there's any problem there.

C - Well, that's all we're trying to do. We're trying to get the first mission or two cross-serviced by you providing an adequate pilot and we'll take the rap for everything else, but if the big boys don't want to do that then I think somebody had better send us something relieving us of all responsibility for any part of this operation except providing an aircraft at a point.

M - Well, I think you've got to provide an aircraft, and should provide such assistance in terms of any technical support on the ground that you have there readily available. I think you should do that, we do the same thing, we support you all the time, all over, and do it happily and badly. I did it when I was in A&C(?). I did more help for you before you got there than you ever realized. And, we expect the same assistance from you.

C - Yuh, so would we.

M - Well, we give it all the time.

C - And so do we, so do we.

M - Well, Pat, there's not much point you and me arguing here much longer. I've sent a copy of this message that was cleared with Gilpatric and Charyk, and you've got a copy of it or should have it by now, of the directive to Power.

C - I don't have any of those yet, but I guess they are over here. All I have at the moment is the cover plans.

M - As far as what we need from you, we'll still make it clear to your people what they need, which I don't think is a hell of a lot, but I think that's already being worked out directly with your people right on the spot. There's no problem there that we know of, absolutely no problem as far as working with your people.

C - Well.

M - Now on this other problem that you raised about something happening to the boy, why he'd get the same treatment that I'd get if I go shot here in the office right now. And we expected that would happen to our people in Vietnam. We've lost a lot of people over there. (Sounds like) It doesn't hurt doing the job (some words indistinct). Obviously, we can't provide what you provide. Nevertheless, that's not a part of the exercise.

C - Well, you don't quite put it together, you see. The problem there is this. There is a cover plan which the Government is stuck with. That's the word of Isaiah. However, those are not the facts of how this guy got killed. Consequently, the insurance companies and any court of law will not rule in favor of the guy because he was committing an act for which he had no authority and which was contrary to our law and our Government.

M - Well, I don't think that that is true in the case of this kind of an operation.

C - Oh, yes sir! It sure as hell is! Because your cover stories never hold water. Never hold water. And all they've got to do, all that has to be shown, is that this guy was committing a hostile act and there isn't an insurance company in the world that'll pay off on it, and we speak from experience because we are now supporting families who were trapped by exactly this thing. However, it's your problem, it's not our problem, and if something like this does happen, why just out of the kindness of our hearts, I think we'd be constrained to help you out, but that's not a promise. But, the thing does exist, Bozo, and it's a very dangerous thing for the individual to be engaged in covert operations without having a corporation to back him up, and unfortunately, the military doesn't have the kind of corporation that's in a position to back him up.

M - But you're going to back us up. You're going to help us out then.

C - I am, huh? That would be real illegal but we're just so anxious to get on with the job we might just consider it, but.....

M - I've done so damn many illegal things for you that if they ever caught up with me, I'd go to jail.

C - Yeah, I know, but you made Vice Chief of Staff.

M - I don't know how long that's going to last here in this present operation. Well, let's go ahead with this thing, Pat, and I don't think it'll be this (indistinct words which may be: time next week) if we keep going round in circles.

C - Well, all I want to know is this: I have an operations room down here fully staffed with SAC personnel who have been doing this for two years. Shall I tell them, you're out of the business? The only thing we do now is furnish an airplane at such-and-such a place. SAC has got everything else there.

M - You furnish the airplane and what ground support we need, which is not a hell of a lot.

C - You don't want any ground support?

M - ~~EX~~ Yuh, we do need some.

C - You need some ground support.

M - That's already been worked out.

C = You don't want any communications. You don't want any liaison with CINCLANT or any of the other areas.

M - Well, that's already been established in the plan. All that's being worked out, Pat.

C - Well, all I want to do is to tell my people here who are standing by now to make their normal daily five o'clock decision that they are now out of business and that whatever SAC needs, furnish them, but take their orders from SAC. Is this what you want?

M - Well, it would be my thought that SAC has now got the ball, but we would call on you for such assistance as we need. Sitting where I'm sitting right now, I don't know what the extent of that assistance is, but certainly I wouldn't think they would operate it from your operations room.

C - Well.

M - Why don't you put it this way. Looking at that message, say OK SAC has got the God damn ball. You're big guys over there--carry the ball. If you need any help from us, let us know what it is. Without giving you the responsibility in case something happens, of getting (risks, rified?) over there.

C - Well, let me bring up a couple of related subjects that you might want to worry about. We've had the Navy flying the film back in A3D's. We hear that this is going to be totally unacceptable now to SAC and that they're going to fly the stuff in. I don't know whether this is true or not but it is part of a system which is beginning to fall apart.

M - Just a minute, I can find out about that.....

C - Well, wait, now, I'm just telling you some of the details that are involved, you see.

M - Well I know, from these conversations today, there's a plan to get the films to you all right away carefully laid out whether the Navy does it or whether the Air Force.....

C - Well, all I'm telling you is that we've been doing it for two years having the Navy fly it with A3D's and the word I get from the Indian level in the Pentagon is that, well, SAC will take over that.

M - OK, OK. What difference does it make who flies the damn stuff.

C - It doesn't make a God damn bit of difference except the Navy loves to do that and they feel like they're part of it and everybody's happy and now we got a new system going in. That's all. I don't care. I'm just telling you some of the things that are going to be disrupted.

Now, the next one is we have six SAC pilots who've been doing this for roughly two years. The word I get is that they are to be stood up and asked if they are ready to revert back to the Air Forces now to take on this task. If the answer is yes, they'll be brought right in. If the answer is no, we'd like to finish our contract with the Agency, then they are to be told, well, that's tough boys, the Air Forces is no longer interested in you. Now, this I get from the Indian level. So this is a problem. I don't know. I just wish that there was somebody over there that had the same objectivity that you do who wanted to get this thing done and.....

M - Pat, on the ground rules given me by high authority was the decision was made that we do it. I don't know what the hell else we do, and as I say I wish I'd never heard of this thing because that's all these guys have had me doing for two God damn days and the only time I've sat down at my desk is on this subject.

C - That's my problem too, Bozo.

M - So I guess that's all you've been doing.

C - That's all I've been doing.

M - Your boss is gone and my boss is gone, and in addition, I've got to sit down in the JCS all day for him.

C - Yup, and my only concern is to make damn sure that every possible competence available is addressed to this problem over the next 72 to 84 hours, 86 hours whatever the hell it is... 96 hours.

M - I couldn't agree more...

C - To make sure that we get what we've got to get and I know we've got the aircraft. I'm assured we have a competent pilot. I know we have the system in existence that has been operating beautifully for two years. And I am just scared to death, by generating all of this new command chain from Omaha and a new ~~new~~ procedure, that something's going to get bugged up where I don't think it's necessary. Now that's my, that's my whole concern and my whole position, and I've said it to you; I've said it to Gilpatric; I've said it to Bundy. About the only guy I haven't said it to is General Taylor and the Holy Ghost, but I'm still going up the chain of command.

M - Well, I've told General Taylor what you said. I was trying to help you out there.

C - Well, thanks, coach, I feel so alone sometimes.

M - Yuh, I know, well so do I. Just think what a fortunate position your're in . You're off the hook and I'm on.

C - You're not, Tommy is, I would say.

M - Who ?

C - Tommy, Tommy Power.

M - Well I put my finger right on him and said well Bud you've got the damn ball.

C - Well

M - And he knows that and he's pretty good at running these kinds of things you know. He is personally going to run it

and he understands that just about as well as anybody, I don't think there's any question about that.

C - Well, he should understand the chain of command and responsibility cause he's in it up to his navel.

M ~~OK~~ Well he's in the business of running pre _____ missions as I say all over and (if anything ?) that outfit they're about as sharp as they come.

C - Yuh, there's no question about it. Well OK Bozo, I'm going to get that directive if it's signed by Gilpatric and if

M - Will, the directive I sent to Power, I signed but Gilpatric coordinated it.

C - Yuh, well the only point is that I have nothing, absolutely nothing ~~yet~~ in writing except oral. I have absolutely nothing in writing which in any way relieves me, the Director of CIA of any of the reconnaissance responsibilities that I have had up to k now, nor do I have anything that tells me to turn over the command responsibility for this operation to the Air Forces. All I have is a conversation with between Charyk and McCone, and between Gilpatric and myself in which the President decided that it would be better to have it as a military operation. That's all I got.

M - Well, Charyk told me that he had talked to McCone yesterday afternoon sometime and McCone bought off completely on this. Whether (you, ~~he~~?) talked to McCone after this or not I don't know.

C - I talked to McCone yesterday morning and then he talked to Gilpatric and there was no meeting of the minds and he told me to go over and get in bed with Gilpatric and see if I couldn't get it straightened out, and since then I've been carrying the ball.

M - Since then you've been a real lonely man haven't you.

C - I've been fumbling all over the God damn place. I ~~km~~ now have this directive just came in.

M

M - Have you got it in front of you? You want me to hold on while you read it?

C - I/m reading it right now..... Well, this puts us completely out of the picture except for an unqualified sentence which says, "Necessary support equipment will be provided," That's all it says.

M - Yuh, that's the pieme of paper you've been looking for, isn't it.

C - Right, now all it says, "Necessary support equipment will be provided" This is a directive from Air Forces to SAC. We're not even info nor are we info for the intentions reports, takeoffs of anything else, so presumably we're completely out of the operations picture.

M - You are info. You were added as info.

C - No, in the message itself. It says intention reports, takeoffs landing reports, and so forth will be dispatched so and so and so and so. We're not in on that although we do have access to the JRC so presumably as a matter of curiosity we can keep in touch.

M - Yuh, we'll keep in touch with you.

C - Now where are you going to get the requirements?

M - We've~~f~~ got the requirements.

C - Oh, you've got the requirements for this one.

M - Yuh we've got ~~the~~ the requirements for the whole business. There's a package here and we've got the whole damn package.

C - That's the COMOR deal?

M - Yuh

C - That was the COMOR deal that was approved by USIB.

M - I presume so.

C - I presume ~~so~~, Well now tell me something else: Is this now out of Special Group ~~xxxxxxx~~ cognizance?

M - I don't know, Pat, I'll have to find out.

C - Well suppose you go on this one and you want to go again day after tomorrow. This requires Special Group

M - Yuh, we are ~~not of that type of thing~~ under their ~~xxxxx~~ cognizance.

C - And it then requires going to the big boss.

M - And SAC ~~xxxx~~ has been told that. Power was personally told that by I guess by Taylor and Charyk both.

C - The, but the take will be handled as it has previously.

M - It will come to you by the most expeditious means possible. Faster than it's ever been before.

C - OK if you can get it into that airplane.

M - KC 135. Is that fast enough for you?

C - That's pretty fast. It isn't quite as plush as a 707.

M - Delivered to you personally at Andrews. You and I will both be ~~there~~ to receive it.

C - Well we've been developing it someplace else you know.

M - Well it's up to where you want it. We can deliver the damn thing to you any where you want it. You just name it. That's where ^{why} they've been delivering ~~(it earlier)~~ *at Andrews.*

C - Well, then do I assume then that SAC will prepare all of the cover instructions, all the cover plans for the pilot that...

M - Yuh, well that's already been given to SAC by...

C - Any screwed up credentials and stuff like that that he needs? Any flight plans to show that he isn't doing anything wrong? All that's going to be taken care of by SAC. All the covert aspects of this operation then, by SAC. Is this right?

M - I thought you said we didn't do anything covert only you coverted.

C - Well you don't, but this is a covert operation because you can't put that poor devil up there with a flight plan that tells him to do something and then deny that he's doing it.

M - I'm sure he's been furnished -- from what I saw from the JCS-- he's been furnished all those instructions.

C - Well, then the only thing I'm lacking is a directive from somebody telling me to back off, and I don't have that.

M - Well, who'd do that/ Wasn't the message enough.

C - No, this message is from headquarters USAF who don't exercise any control over me. If it's from Gilpatric as ~~acting Chief~~ Acting Chairman of the Special Group, maybe that's all right, or if it's from Bundy I could buy it on behalf of the President, but I suppose it's my responsibility to dig up some release from anything except furnishing you ~~the~~ whatever support you asked for, and we'll fall all over ourselves in the field, Bozo, as soon as I get the instruction, we'll start falling all over ourselves right now.

M - Well good.

C - I think, well we already have, our people in the field are all in bed. I think it's an unfortunate move, and unla ppy move, but we'll do ~~everything~~ every God damn thing we can to make it operate.

M - I knew you would take that attitude.

C - And our people are already doing this. And I sure as hell hope it works. I sure as hell hope it works.

M - Much as I do.

k

C - I will want a reading as to whether our operations room and our SAC people who are here are going to have any responsibility or an connection with the weather reading, the go, nogo, or anything like that.

M - I will get that word to your duty officer...

C - From what I understand from you, the whole thing is probably going to ~~be~~ right from SAC headquarters, is that right.

M - I don't know.

C - I don't know either.

M - Yuh, it'll be operated ^{direct} ~~right~~ from SAC headquarters. All that kind of work is done from SAC HEADQUARTERS.

C - Well, I will try to get something from Bundy to protect the Agency, and what it's going to be I don't know, but

M - I would think you're protected.

C - Well I'm not protected if

M - Well, you haven't been told to do it, so...

C - I haven't been told ~~do~~ to do anything yet, by anybody.

M - If you haven't been told to do any, God damn it, I don't know what the hell protection you need.

C - Well, we still have a responsibility, you see. We have not been relieved of the responsibility of furnishing, of meeting ~~the~~ the requirements for reconnaissance, that's the problem. Now I've got to be relieved by that, from that by somebody. I see the directive that puts it on SAC. That comes from Air Force headquarters, and I know of the decision that it would be better to have it a military cover operation rather than a Lockheed cover operation. I know of this, and we'll give you all the possible support that we have ~~xxx~~ available and you can ~~xxx~~ utilize every facility that we got until you get the transition capability for yourself. I don't know but what it might be better to unload these aircraft on you too, and give you the ground support if we're out of the business from this particular area. But at the moment we're charged with furnishing you a flyable aircraft I guess, cause we have the only capability for that. I sure hope as hell it stays together.

M - I do too

C - We won't purposely bugger it up ~~but~~ I assure you.

M - Well, I hope you get that other one ready too.

C - Well, we're getting the other one ready just as fast as we can.

M - That's important.

C - I do think you've got to realize and I don't know ~~why~~ how you're going to do it, that we have six fully qualified pilots who've been doing this for two years off and on who are ready to go, except they are under contract ~~to~~ to us, even though they're your boys, and that you have at the present only two, one of whom's in bed with a cold.

M - How did he get in bed with a cold.

C - Well, a sore arm but now he's got something wrong with him, he can't fly an airplane. He's DNIF. And the other two guys haven't flown for a year.

M - Well, ~~maybe~~ maybe we'll have to un ----- a little.

C - Well yeah it may well be and if LeMay says bring them back in the Air Force and they want to come ~~why~~ that could be done overnight, if we follow the normal procedures, it'll take probably months, but I'm concerned about them too and I'm in deeper concern/ about the poor devil who's sitting up there riding this iron charger as a Major in the Air Forces committing an unlawful act.

M - Pat, you really are feeling alone aren't you.

C - I'm real alone. I'm feeling alone because I think there are a lot of people at high levels making a lot of decisions without the background ~~XXX~~ of what the problem really is and how professionally something like this has to be done and how you can't turn it over to somebody overnight who hasn't been doing it in this atmosphere, that's all. I don't say SAC can't fly airplanes a hell of a lot better than we can.

M - I understand your ~~feelings~~ feelings. ~~I~~ I understand your fears. The position in which we have been placed, I have no alternative.

C - I know, I don't have any alternative either.
sitting here

M - You and I are ~~probably~~ commiserating with each other having been told to do something by a high level decision, and I don't think there's a God damn thing we can do about it besides go ahead and do the best we can.

C - Yuh, well we'll fall all over ourselves to do everything we can in here and in the field. I won't fight the problem anymore. All I've got to do is get something from Bundy or from some authority that exercised control over me which isn't Gilpatric or anybody in the Pentagon telling me that I no longer have the responsibility for this type of activity except to render all possible support to the ~~EX~~ DOD. That's all I need.

M - I can't do that for you.

C - Well ~~EX~~ I know you can't. / I'll ^{so} ~~have to~~ call up Bundy and see if he'll give it to me.

M - OK

C - In the meantime as you well know in the field you don't have problems ~~like~~ like these. Those guys are probably falling all over themselves down there.

M - ~~EX~~ Yuh, they get along fine, I've always found that out. All these God damn arguments go on in Washington. I'm beginning to think we're all pretty stupid up here. And I want to go back to the field too where people are nice to each other, get along with each other.

C - Yuh, well take me with you, will you, Bozo. I get along fine with you. I just don't want to be holding SAC's sack, that's all.

M - Oh, don't worry. I'm holding the sack for them, unfortunately, but I'm going to pass it along to Power.

C _ Well, OK, Bozo, I'll give the boys the word, and you tell Tommy Powers anything we got that he wants and needs for this, why all he has to do is ask for it, and if he doesn't know ~~it~~ what we've got, we'd be delighted to tell him, but not to rest too heavily on the capabilities in the Pentagon because in this type of operations, they just aren't organized there to control it, you know.

M - That's for sure. This is the most overcontrolled operation I've ever been in.

C - Ok.

M - O, Goodbye

Noted by

13 OCT 62

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00 YVQLAZ 43K

00 YVQLAZ 43K

00 121910Z

00 ARSSO USAF

TO ZEN/ARSSO SAC

INFO JCS, J-3, FOR JRC

DECE

DECE

TOP SECRET RELEASABLE FROM ISO CHANNELS. FROM AFVVC-
10-333, ARSSO SAC FOR GEN POWER, GEN COMPTON AND DOCOR,
TOP SECRET ONLY. REF AFVVC SA 30922-02. PART I. THIS
CONSTITUTES YOUR AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE OPERATION BRASS KNOB
SAC OPS PLAN 67-63 AGAINST TARGET CONTAINED IN REFERENCED
MESSAGE. SAC HAS EXECUTION AUTHORITY AND WILL
EXECUTE THIS MISSION FROM NORTH EDWARDS AFB AS SOON AS TARGET
WEATHER IS SUITABLE, AND AS SOON AS PILOT IS REQUALIFIED.
BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS WILL PROBABLY BE
LAUGHLIN AFB. NECESSARY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WILL BE PROVIDED. PART II.
24 HOUR INTENTIONS REPORTS, TAKE OFF AND LANDING REPORTS WILL BE DIS-
PATCHED TO JCS EXCLUSIVE FOR J-3, JRC; HQ USAF EXCLUSIVE FOR
AFVVC-SA; CINCLANT EXCLUSIVE FOR CMDR WICKENMEISER; CONAD
EXCLUSIVE SWIVEL CHAIR. PART III. FILM WILL BE COURIERED TO
ANDREWS AFB WHERE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE WILL MEET SAC COURIER.
DETAILS WILL FOLLOW. SCP-3.

00 1500

00 1911Z OCT

D

~~Let~~ Let Comm.

Telecon between General Carter and Secretary Gilpatrick, , around 3:00, 12 Oct

Secretary Gilpatrick: I have just been talking with Charyk, McKee and Power. As I understand it, Bundy said if there is going to be any delay as far as Sac is concerned beyond Sunday, we will go ahead with the Agency mission.

C: I am most reluctant to go ahead with the Agency under the present conditions. I think the weather is going to hold us up.

G: General Power just told me that as far as the pilot's concerned, there wont be any question after Sunday.

C: I have told our people to figure on doing it on Sunday with the Air Force pilot, if the weather is good. In any event, to do it on Monday. He is in ground school yesterday, flying today, and we would like to fly him once more tomorrow, but again this is just a difference of opinion.

G: I think we are on the same wave length.

C: If you are ready to let him go on Sunday, we are ready to run the mission. I want to make one thing clear. There are two problems on which we feel the decision is _____. The aircraft will be operated through our system and our operational control and that the take goes through the same channel as it has been.

G: McKee just said your control system would be used.

C: We have done over 60 of these. There are some problems ~~on which we feel the decision is~~ I think you should be concerned about the individual problems of the individual involved.

C: The people we use are under contract and we have insurance problems that we can handle very easily. In the Air Force we have no personal insurance. As you know, we have 6 fellows under contract to us and the ... you would get from the Air Force is that they are ready to stand those fellows up and say to them that if you will put your soldier suit back on, very well then if not, forget about ever coming back to the Air Force. I really think to do this thing in the best interest, we should put the boys in blue suits and keep them under our cover, I am concerned about the individuals personal problems. I can tell my people that this will be under our control, that we will make the go-no-go from here, etc, except that there will be an Air Force pilot. This is the way Bundy felt we ought to do it -- at least until some substitute system that is adequate can be generated.

--

Believe Secretary Gilpatrick said here that he was not sure of all the details and suggested that General Carter get in touch with General McKee. Also asked General Carter to mention the insurance problem to General McKee.

2nd
10-12-64

Conversation Between General Carter and Secretary Gilpatric on
Friday, 12 October

C: Sorry to bother you, Sir. I wanted you to know that I've had two long conversations with General McKee --

G: He just left here.

C: I am totally unconvinced, I told McGeorge Bundy this and you can expect a call from him --

G: I've been trying to get him.

C: He's not fairly clued in on all the various aspects of this, nor I suppose am I or you or is anybody, really, but I say I am totally unconvinced that this is the proper way to do this thing and --

G: I guess I'll just have to choose between your judgment, which I respect, and General Power, who is competent, and General McKee and others who believe that SAC can be in a position to ____ this effectively and --

C: On Monday, as early as Sunday or Monday.

G: General Power left before he could have told to him what the various points you've raised with Bozo McKee but overall he's competent, he's the Chief of Operations out at SAC and has reviewed the whole thing and also with Colonel Geary and ____? ____ and the others --

C: Well, it's all right, it's one of those things where a high degree of built-in competence is being thrown aside at which I consider a very highly critical period in the operation, but I can't seem to get this across to anybody when a week or two weeks of transition could very easily be accomplished and not run this risk. I say I just can't seem to get through so I have reached the point now where I still am totally disenchanted with this concept and am asking for relief from all responsibility other than support, whatever support we can provide to SAC.

G: All the product goes to you.

C: Well, yes Sir. We get the product but with the degree of competence we have exhibited so far, to put in a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and communications and ground support system on 72 hours' notice to me doesn't make a God damn bit of sense, Mr. Secretary. I say I feel very strongly about this as Director of Central Intelligence, not as representing the Agency or as any jurisdictional support. It just doesn't make sense.

G: You have made your position very clear and I fully understand it and I've gotten equally clear ringing tones from the Commanding General of SAC and General Taylor agrees that this should not be a split responsibility, that it should be a combined operation.

C: I agree 100 per cent that it should not be a split responsibility. All I want to do is borrow one little fellow in a blue suit and put him into my system until, over a period of a week or two weeks, we can get SAC to get over the system if this is the decision. That's all I want to do.

G: Well, the difference is that SAC thinks that they can get it quicker than you think they can do it. As I said, that's the \$64 question.

C: Well, in that case, yes Sir, if the decision is that that's the way it's going to be, and from what I can make out the decision has already been made, although I have nothing relieving me of the responsibility, then we'll render all possible support that we can. I still think that it's the wrong decision and I will still want something to relieve the Agency of the responsibility which it presently bears, that's all.

G: I think whatever you need in the way of evidence, either from Mac Bundy or even 5412 or the White House, I don't know, I'm going to talk to Mac --

C: Yes Sir, he said he was going to get in touch with you. Mac has the idea that this is a couple of squabbling children and I'm not inclined to perhaps go along with that in part, although it just frightens me, that's all, and this is not as far as I'm concerned this is not a jurisdictional, bureaucratic problem. We are perfectly prepared to turn over the operation but we'd like to do it in as orderly means

as possible. I still think that is the wrong decision. I think we can provide the military cover story in 20 minutes that will meet all of the requirements of the President, and this was the, if you recall, this was the original purpose of the exercise as I understood it, was to change the cover story because the old one wasn't good any more.

G: Well, we've all gone around and around on this thing for the past 24 hours and we have a fairly clear-cut idea. (Secretary's note: this portion was very indistinct but I believe what Secretary Gilpatric said is that the military would not take the responsibility, that if he were General Power he wouldn't take it, unless they were very sure they could do it.

C: Well, I don't think General Power does know what is involved, Sir. --

G: They say they do. I think you underestimate them. After all, SAC has been in this business for 15 years and they fly these missions all the time and nothing could be unique about this, I wouldn't think, and they operate the whole thing, command and control wise, and _____ - wise, no matter where the mission is, out of Omaha, whether it's _____, or the Baltic, or --

C: Yes Sir. SAC has not operated in any overflights under any covert operations, to my knowledge, Sir. And this is certainly a covert operation.

G: Well the distinction between covert and a peripheral operation is about seven minutes over --

C: It's seven minutes, Sir, but you've got the pilot lying and the U. S. Government lying, and I consider this a covert operation. However, I don't deny SAC's tremendous capabilities. All I say is that in this most excruciating tense situation where we don't know what we're getting into, have no concept of what we may get into, and where we have an operating procedure that has been in existence for two years with qualified pilots and with aircraft that have been in this system, then I say that we ought to retain that competence at least until we've broken in the people who are going to take it over. It's as simple as that. These aircraft are ours, we're the only ones that have spare parts for them, we're the only ones that are now qualified to maintain --

G: That's no problem, though.

C: No, I've already directed my people, in line with your directive, to render all possible support to SAC.

G: Well, we'll get this in a piece of paper, unless there's a change, but I'm not concerned --

C: Well, I just wanted you to know, Sir, that I've talked to Mr. Bundy, I did not get a chance to express myself either as vociferously or as lengthy as I have to you, but I did want you to know I'm really unhappy, I think it's a wrong decision, but if that's it, we'll do every damn thing we can to make it work, and that's about all we can do.

G: Well, no one can take exception to that, Pat.

C: OK Sir, Good luck.

Conversation between General Carter and McGeorge Bundy on Friday,
12 October

C: I thought you ought to know that the Air Forces have sent a directive to SAC giving them full and complete responsibility for the entire operation -- this includes everything.

B: Is this OK with you?

C: No, it's not OK with me at all. I've been fighting Gilpatric ever since noon yesterday, but it seems I'm fighting Tamany Hall, I just don't know where to move next. I thought when I talked to you this morning that it was your consensus that until we could get in an orderly transition, if this is what they want, if this is what we --

B: I don't know what you and Ros have said to each other, Pat, and I am just in no position to manage this one from here. It does seem to me that there is no point in having an enormous jurisdictional war over it --

C: Well, I'm not concerned about that if we can get into an orderly transition. But we've been in this business over two years, we've done over sixty of them, and the only thing that has really occurred to change anything is putting a guy in a blue suit into the airplane, that's the only thing that's changed. This started out --

B: Well, why don't you call Ros and talk to him direct about it. I'm trying to call the President right now --

C: Well, he's completely deaf. Can I come over there with a directive for you to sign, relieving us of all responsibility?

B: I'm not going to sign anything until I've talked to him and I must say the whole thing looks to me like two quarrelsome children, and I just can't figure it out from where I sit.

C: Well, it isn't that easy. I wish it were.

B: But I'm not in a position to deal with it at the moment and I've got the call on the other line. Talk to Ros and then I'll talk to you again.

C: OK, we oughtto have a meeting, maybe.

B: I can't believe it needs that, and I've got a million other things to do, but I'll talk to you again.

C: OK.

Conversation between General Carter and General Taylor on
Friday, 12 October.

C - has grave doubts as to their capabilities to take this operation over in that type of time with anything like the competence that we've built into it over two years and over 60 of them.

T - Well, everybody has the highest regard for the way you've done it, Pat. Do you really think there is anything (flexible) about this _____?

C - I really do, Sir. I have the gravest doubts about it. I have been totally unable to get through to Mr. Gilpatric or General McKee or---

T - You have not talked to them?

C - Yes, Sir, I've talked to them at tremendous length. I don't know whether you recall it or not, but this matter started out as some dissatisfaction with the cover plan in view of recent events.

T - Yes, that is right, the feeling was that that was not the best kind of cover for it.

C - That's right, Sir. Then from that point on, somehow it's gotten completely out of phase until where it's no longer a change in the cover plan, which could have been effected in 20 minutes by rewriting the cover plan. Now the complete operation has been turned over to SAC, lock, stock, and barrel.

T - I think the reason, Pat, the justification that has been given to me, is the feeling is that now it's a rather complicated and many-sided program and, assuming the whole thing is approved, and has centralized control of it, it is probably a desirable thing.

C - Oh yes, Sir. We don't argue with that at all, General, all we're trying to do is to effect some sort of orderly transition if you're going to do it, whereas---

T - But, really nothing is going except this first shot which I had hoped to get off just as fast as possible.

C - Well if the weather is right, that will get off Monday.

T - Monday, I thought---

C - Monday at the earliest. SAC says the one pilot that they have is competent--

T - They told me more pilots than that, Pat. I think we're getting different information on some of these things.

C - Well, we happen to have the information, Sir, that applies to this aircraft because we're the only people who have that type of aircraft. SAC has pilots with many many hours on the U-2--

T - But not with the other engine?

C - But not with the J-75 engines, no Sir. The most competent pilots that they have right now. One has 15 hours with that engine and the other has 25. One of these fellows is down with a sore arm and can't fly, and the one that we're working on now to try to make him operationally current, we sent him through school until yesterday and we've been flying him today, has not flown that aircraft since January of 1962, of this year, and SAC said he was competent even before we had looked into his capabilities and we would like at least another day of flying him. He has no GCA in that aircraft and you just can't say that one U-2 is like another. All the power settings are different, all your flying characteristics as far as engine performance is concerned are different, your fuel consumption is entirely different, so I just want you to know sir, that in accordance with the decision made by Mr. Gilpatric, and he told me he was acting for the President, we are supporting SAC, but we have no operational responsibility for the project.

T - Well, let me just repeat the information now with regard to the availability ~~xxx~~ of the pilots. You say there are only two pilots available?

C - There are only two pilots available presently to SAC that have any competence at all in the J-75 aircraft.

T - They have had only 15 and 25 flying hours respectively--

C - Fifteen and 25 flying hours respectively on this aircraft. They had had hundreds of hours on the 57, the original U-2.

T - What about the availability of equipment?

C - Well, we have one aircraft ready to go and another one shortly coming out of the shop. We have two that are ready to go now.

T - This is taking over your aircraft?

C - Yes, Sir. They're putting their own pilots in our aircraft. We'll furnish the operational aircraft and the ground support, and I've offered them every possible facility, including our operations room here which has been doing this damn near every couple of weeks for two years. We've had over 60 successful missions but apparently they don't want any part of that, Sir. It's going to be operated from SAC and we're not even on the information addressee as to take-off and stuff like that. I am deeply concerned, General, that's all I wanted you to know, Sir.

T - I'm glad you called me and I'll do some checking on it.

C - I'm going to call Mac Bundy now and ask him if he'll give me something in writing relieving us of the responsibility other than supporting SAC.

T - OK

Conversation Between General Carter and U. Alexis Johnson on Friday,
12 October

C: I just thought you should know, as a member of Special Group, that the command and control responsibility for these flights that we talk about has now been assigned to SAC, lock, stock, and barrel. We are out of the business entirely, except to support them. I am totally disenchanted personally with the idea and officially as the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, I don't question SAC's competence, I question their operational capability at the moment. I wanted you to know this because I've told this to General Taylor, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Bundy, ~~and the~~ and as the other member of the Special Group available, I just wanted to register my protest. I don't know where I go from here. ~~This~~

J: I don't understand how all this came about. We agreed on one type of cover on this thing and I thought you were going to, I ~~didn't~~ didn't know there was ~~any~~ any question of you not carrying it out.

C: We didn't either, Sir. That was our understanding.

~~XXXXXXXX~~

J: My only interest and thought on the thing was the cover we have on it, the contingency cover.

C: Yes Sir. We agree completely with the change in the cover plan, but --

J: Yes, but how it was carried out operationally I didn't feel competent to say.

C: No. Well, it was our understanding that we would just change the cover plan, do enough to make it look clean, and continue the operation.

J: That's what I thought was going to be done.

C: Yes Sir, well, that's what we thought was going to be done. This is not the way it has happened.

J: I don't understand; how did all this other come about then?

C: It apparently got generated in the Pentagon, Sir, and has been cleared throughout the Department of Defense and Mr. Gilpatric has made the decision, acting in what he thought was the Presidential desire.

J: Well, the President approved it either way.

C: Yes sir. Well, all --

J: Well if it has been done, all right.

C: It has been done. I have nothing releasing me over here. It's all been done within the Department of Defense but, at Mr. Gilpatric's direction, and as I say I've talked to him several times and he feels that this is within the authority that was given him by the President and that this is the way to do it. I have complained to him and I have complained to Bundy, in view of the --

J: Yeah, your operational competence I thought was going to be retained.

C: That's what we thought, Sir. Our operational competence extends over 61 missions over a period of about 2 years without a single problem and now --

J: Yes, I'm sorry to see that lost.

C: That is completely lost now, the entire chain of command and everything else will rest from Omaha, and as far as I can make out, all we're doing is supplying the airplanes, and some very low competence of pilots are being used when you compare them against the six that we've been in the business. So I say ~~it~~ I'm very unhappy, I have expressed myself just as vociferously as I can at all echelons, but I thought that I'd better cut in the Special Group since they are the ones that are holding the sack on it.

J: Yeah, well thanks for letting me know, Pat.

Conversation between General Carter and Mr. Bundy, Saturday,
13 October 1962.

General Carter: I talked to the boss last night when he was out on the West Coast. He said that on that subject, they didn't discuss with the President more than 30 seconds and all they agreed on was that the cover plan should be changed. I talked to Alexis Johnson and he gave me the same answer.

Mr. Bundy: He wasn't there.

C - No, but it was his clear understanding he said....

B - Look, Pat, I told you where I stood on it last night. Now does the Director want me to reopen ~~xxx~~ it with Gilpatric or not?

C - Well, Gilpatric is talking to Scoville on the telephone right now, because I was talking to Scoville and they interrupted me. The old man's reaction said that if that's the way they're going to run the railroad, let them run the God damn thing and let's hope it doesn't get wing. Now that's generally exactly what he said. He doesn't have any more confidence in this type of procedure than I do, and I've expressed myself awful vociferously. Scoville was going to suggest to Gilpatric that we have a round table meeting on this thing, but I think the wheels of progress have gained such tremendous momentum unilaterally by Gilpatric's actions that there's just probably no way of stopping them. The Air Forces are now in it up to their navel.

B - Well, I'd be inclined to let it be..

C - I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act. I mean this is transparent.

B - Well, I don't feel that way about it.

C - Well, I do. ~~Ex~~ It puts them in covert operations and if you want to put the Department of Defense in covert operations of that type why we've got to change a lot of our thinking around here, but I'm going to see what Gilpatric has to say to Scoville. In the meantime, I'm going to be coming over with a memorandum, saying what I think and asking for a release from our presently assigned responsibilities which I have absolutely nothing on in any way, shape or form except telephone conversations.

B - Sure enough

C - OK

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14 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Factors Involved in CIA vs SAC Control,
Command, and Support of Cuban U-2
Reconnaissance

1. This paper is in response to a requirement of the DCI for an analysis of the factors involved in consideration of the possible designation of SAC as executive agent for the further conduct of Cuban U-2 reconnaissance flights. In addition, it contains, at Attachment A, a brief history of Project IDEALIST's involvement with the J-75 version of the U-2 and the reasons why USAF did not adopt this model. While principally for information, the paper does contain a staff recommendation for the Director in Paragraph 3.

2. It seems to us counter-productive to argue from the start that SAC could not conduct U-2 reconnaissance of the island of Cuba, using either their own J-57 U-2s or those IDEALIST J-75 U-2s which could be made available to them were this course of action decided upon. Yet, before a decision is made to transfer Project IDEALIST U-2s to SAC control for future flights simply because a SAC pilot may be more desirable in the present political climate and Air Force markings are placed on the aircraft, we believe due consideration should be given to the following factors, not necessarily set forth in the order of their importance:

a. CIA Employment of Special Project Concept: Since its inception, the Agency has managed and operated the U-2 program as a self-contained project, with the attention of a small group of people in headquarters and the field directed toward its success and concerned over its problems and its security. This task force has had within its structure the

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
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capability to not only run its own affairs, but to provide its own separate, speedy communications, its own professional security force, a separate operations planning staff and a closely related staff materiel organization. It has called for Air Force support in terms of personnel, materiel and air-lift from a single coordinated point. This project has not only had its own intelligence staff, dealing with other Agencies as their support was required for a mission, but it has been physically proximate to the COMOR, from which mission requirements were received on a community-wide basis. This unified group of people, all working within the same Agency and under the same security system, has had seven years of experience with the U-2, during which time some 327 overflights of denied territory have been successfully conducted, not including some 41 peripheral flights. In Cuba alone, 61 overflights have been conducted periodically since 1960. Research and Development designed to improve the aircraft performance has been carried on continuously and expeditiously within this same Project framework. Even in an organization like SAC, separate from the balance of the Air Force, this kind of unified management, operations and support is very difficult to duplicate, and transferring this concept to SAC from CIA in workable form would require considerable time, planning and experience.

b. CIA Employment of Contractor Maintenance: Again from the start, this Agency has employed a system of contractor-furnished maintenance personnel for the U-2 airframe and engine as well as for the majority of the other aircraft intelligence collection systems. This has ensured the highest degree of reliability throughout the life of the aircraft, although this record has not been achieved inexpensively. Aircrew personnel furnished by Lockheed have averaged more than 15 years of experience and many of them now have more than seven years working continuously with the U-2. The military system, fraught with continuous rotation, is simply incapable of equalling this kind of experience level, and it is this that pays off in the final analysis in terms of missions successfully run without incident or accident.

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c. Special Security Clearances and Containment of Mission Information: Another major factor working for program integrity is the fact that Project IDEALIST has been operated since its start under a separate security clearance system and has had available to it an integrated force of professionally trained security officers with a high degree of mission orientation, serving the project full-time both in headquarters and the field. The single security system concept extends into industrial areas as well. One of its major benefits is that it has been continuously possible to ensure the maximum amount of containment for mission objectives by making certain that the "need-t-know" principle was uniformly applied among the smallest number of people possible. We submit that such a system does not today exist within the Air Force, where security policy is often the prerogative of local commanders.

d. Communications and Communications Security: The Project IDEALIST Communications Staff operates not only administrative communications but is responsible for operations communications as well. In contrast to the Air Force system, all Project traffic is by direct circuit transmission and all of it is enciphered to the highest standards. The Communications Staff is composed exclusively of professional personnel, trained to the uniform Agency standard of maximum proficiency, security and speed. The only cryptographic violations we have experienced in the past year, for example, have been on those circuits manned by USAF personnel. This staff has also furnished specialized communications and ELINT service to Project IDEALIST, in the form of engineering and maintenance assistance. On ELINT systems, they work closely with the analysts so that technical maintenance enjoys a real-time relationship to the collection equipment. This is an important asset not available in package form to the Air Force. As an example of its speed, and even allowing for SAC unfamiliarity with communications from Omaha to Edwards AFB, on the initial SAC-executed mission of 14 October, the "Go-No-Go" weather forecast took SAC a total of 14 hours, 22 minutes to transmit through relay points from Omaha to EAFB, in contrast to a re-transmission time of one hour, 13 minutes from Washington to EAFB on CIA's system.

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utilized in this instance as a backup capability. By the time the SAC forecast arrived at Edwards, the mission had been on the ground at McCoy AFB for 42 minutes, and the weather was no longer within the valid period for which it had been requested.

e. Mission Security: Mission security, both in headquarters and the field, has long been traditional with Project IDEALIST. Employment with headquarters or a field detachment has never entitled anyone to mission information, pertaining either to targets, routes or times. When support is required from other Agencies, i.e., NSA, NORAD, JRC, etc., the most that is given out in advance of the mission is the general area and valid times for Coast-In and Coast-Out Points. Only after a mission has departed is flight line information given to just those Agencies required to have it in performance of their support mission. Within Air Force we have seen that this is not the way in which they operate; routes are posted in Command Situation Rooms well in advance of mission times, and access to these rooms is too often on the basis of rank and position rather than "need-to-know." Clearance status of personnel viewing flight routes is often impossible to determine, especially in advance. Careful adherence to this form of mission security has been a vital ingredient in reducing political as well as operational risk.

f. Relocation of Targeting and Requirements Responsibility: Under the IDEALIST system, targeting and requirements responsibility has been contained within a single unit located in Washington where the political decisions necessary to implement missions are made. As missions are run, follow-on missions can quickly be planned on the basis of film readout, also accomplished nearby. COMOR evaluations can be transmitted to Operations across the hall. If SAC receives mission responsibility, not only with this close physical relationship be broken, but missions will be launched from Omaha rather than from within the shadow of the Special Group (5412). We have always had the capability to postpone a mission up to takeoff time, based upon late-breaking political developments. Under

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SAC operations, this capability will be materially reduced. In addition, SAC is not experienced in the "headquarters-directed mission" concept in operation of the U-2, since their mission launching responsibility has always been delegated down to the Wing level from SAC Headquarters.

g. Pilot Experience Levels: The Agency U-2 pilot group average at least six years flying the U-2. The majority of their flight time has been spent in the J-75 model since its introduction in 1958. At present, SAC has exactly one pilot checked out and current in the J-75, with three others available who have flown the aircraft within periods running from six to 15 months ago. Retraining would be required for these latter pilots, and in view of the present shortage of mission aircraft, an hour flown today in training mission is an hour subtracted from mission availability. CIA's pilot group is all-weather qualified in the J-75 model and they are all checked out and current in in-flight refueling techniques. SAC at present has only two pilots qualified but not current in IFR techniques. Notional cover with proper backstopping in Air Force could be furnished for CIA pilots to fly the missions without requiring their full integration into USAF. This would be useful for the shorter term it appears to us and would permit continuation of the missions at the highest level consistent with available equipment and with the most experienced pilots. Its adoption would require the strongest kind of support at high levels, since it appears likely that SAC and senior DOD elements would object, now that a mission has been flown successfully under full military responsibility.

3. It would seem that the basic questions at issue here are the following:

a. As a National Policy, should covertly executed over-head reconnaissance of denied areas be performed by the Defense Establishment, or, because of the plausible denial aspect, by the Central Intelligence Agency with DOD support?

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b. If the question above can be answered, then how should covertly executed overhead reconnaissance be managed? Should it be by the compartmented "special project" method with an isolated, integrated capability and control system or by its normal assignment to a major Department with a subsequent breakout of functions through the Department staff?

Since the President has not yet decided to overtly acknowledge overhead reconnaissance of Cuba with military assets, but has limited his official position to a reported willingness to acknowledge peripheral reconnaissance of the island by the military, and then only in the event of an incident, it would appear to us that grounds still exist to consider these missions as covert enterprises, deserving of professional execution by that staff most experienced in conduction operations within the smallest circle of knowledgeable people. On that basis, it is our recommendation that the DCI continue to support execution of Cuban U-2 reconnaissance under the command control and guidance of this Agency, with such additional support as may be required from USAF and SAC to carry out the mission in military guise.

Attachments

- A - J-75 Employment
- B - Operations Plan

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LAD/CSA/JACunningham:mh (14 Oct 62)

Distribution:

- #1 - DCI**
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ATTACHMENT A -

PROJECT IDEALIST EMPLOYMENT OF J-75 U-2

Initially, the U-2 aircraft was test flown in August of 1955 with the J-57-P37 engine which lacked some of the refinements incorporated into the J-57-P31 model originally ordered by USAF for the B-52 aircraft. The P31 version of the basic Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine, with 11,200 pounds of Sea Level Static Thrust, was usefully employed in the Project beginning with the first successful overflight on 26 June 1956 until the last CIA-possessed J-57 aircraft was converted to J-75 configuration this summer, after not having been actively flown since April of 1960, when it was last used

In order to explain how we became involved with the J-75, it is necessary to say a word or two about Project THERMOS, which was an anti-radar reflective coating for S and X Band radars. Work was begun on this blanket reflective coating placed on an underlay of honeycomb material in early 1957. In addition, a wire trapezoidal network was strung around the aircraft from nose to tail, extending outboard to the wing tips as added protection to break up the radar silhouette. While this was within the aerodynamic envelope of the U-2, and hopefully offered us a capability to penetrate the USSR early warning net without open detection, it was heavy and caused drag, reducing the altitude across the mission profile by a minimum of 1,500 feet, with a greater penalty at some points early in the mission.

In the winter of 1957-58, Kelly Johnson suggested to Dick Bissell that a more powerful engine might be the answer to our altitude problems. Accordingly, study was begun on obtaining a power plant that could be used in the U-2 without requiring major redesign of the fuselage. We were thus limited to the diameter of the U-2 as it was built for the J-57 engine. Several plants were considered, including higher performance British engines, until Kelly Johnson discovered that by relocating the mounted accessories on the J-75 engine, and by enlarging the air scoops, he could shoehorn the J-75 into the U-2 at minimum cost in terms of time. This engine is the same basic engine used in the F-105 and in its commercial versions in the Boeing 707. Original J-75 engines for our aircraft were obtained by USAF from the Navy.

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ATTACHMENT A

Its Sea Level Static Thrust was 15,800 pounds, and the differential, translated at altitude into roughly 3,000 feet across the mission profile. Because it had a higher specific fuel consumption than the J-57 model, it was necessary to add slipper fuel tanks to the wings as had been begun even at the earlier model, and even so, the maximum altitude profile range dropped from that of the J-57 U-2. It was not until late 1959, when Project THERMOS was dropped as only a partial success and the honeycomb and blanket were removed from the covered aircraft that the J-75 began to demonstrate its clear superiority over its J-57 brother which was used on the SAC U-2s.

It should be noted that CIA was always more concerned with altitude capability than was SAC, since the respective missions were different. A political decision was made in 1956 by the Administration at that time which gave covert overhead reconnaissance, or overflight, responsibility to CIA, preserving for SAC and other military services only that portion of the reconnaissance program that was peripheral. Since CIA overflights were at that time directed primarily against the USSR, it was important to maximize altitude as a hedge against known (and forecast) Soviet defensive fighter capabilities. With the discovery of Surface-to-Air Missile sites in Russia early in the program, and knowing that time would see improvement in this capability, altitude was money in the bank.

SAC, on the other hand, devoted much of their U-2 time to extended range missions over friendly countries in support of upper air sampling requirements for AFOAT (later AFTAC). On these flights, respectable altitude in the mid and upper 60s was sufficient to meet the technical collection requirements. With the cost of J-75 engines averaging in excess of \$230,000 each, and the additional cost of modifying and converting the U-2 to a full J-75 configuration (around \$350,000 each), SAC was constrained from converting their fleet, which was then and remains much larger than that possessed by the Agency (SAC presently has an inventory of 24 U-2s;

After 1 May 1960, the Agency converted three of its remaining U-2s to what was called "an IFR configuration". This gave a capability

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ATTACHMENT A

of refueling the main tanks (@ 8,000 gallons) in flight from a KC-135 tanker, and thus gave a great boost to mission range, now limited only by pilot fatigue. Other modifications were made to differentiate CIA U-2s from those owned by SAC. Among these latter are:

We are advised by Lockheed that there are additional significant differences between the two models of the U-2 now, brought on by altered ship wiring on SAC aircraft, and other penalty items involving weight that have reduced the altitude capability of the J-57 U-2 more than initially.

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ATTACHMENT B

NORMAL MISSION OPERATIONS PLAN

The conduct of operations follows a general pattern of planning, preparation, direction and execution. Planning begins with preliminary target requirements COMOR forwards to USIB and the Special Group for approval. At this time information pertaining to a proposed mission is contained within the Operations Division/ OSA. Upon approval by the Special Group, the implementation mechanism is set in motion.

Execution procedures are the same for forward staging bases as for operations conducted from a permanent base except for the lead time required to preposition necessary equipment and personnel. The following operational control procedures are standard for Agency activities:

ALERT: The initial action is to review the weather in the target area. When the weather is acceptable for photographic reconnaissance the Agency U-2 detachment is alerted. This alert is provided not less than 24 hours prior to takeoff for a mission. At this time the detachment is given the general framework of the intended mission in order to allow proper preparation. This information includes takeoff time, general area of operation, equipment desired and special instructions as appropriate. At this time support agencies such as NORAD, Search and Rescue, CINCLANT for fighter cover, JRC for overall coordination, NPIC, HEPC, selected processing facility, and Headquarters USAF, are advised. In addition, higher echelons of the Agency are advised of impending activity.

MISSION PLAN: Weather in the target area is again reviewed and, if satisfactory, the detailed mission plan is provided to the operating detachment not later than twelve hours prior to takeoff. Included in the plan are detailed requirements including penetration times, altitudes, headings, targets, and camera flight lines. Also included are emergency instructions, authorized emergency landing bases in order of priority and any special information regarding survival, cover, and friendly forces that may be pertinent to the mission. Hostile AOB, ROB, etc., is also provided at this time to prepare for the pilot briefing.

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ATTACHMENT B

GO-NO-GO: A final review of target weather is accomplished and the authority to launch the mission is provided to the detachment not less than two hours prior to takeoff. At this time the information is also passed to supporting agencies as well as higher echelons of the Agency. A final recheck is made in Headquarters to see that political approval is still not affected by late breaking developments.

By utilizing the procedures above complete planning, direction and control of operations is retained by the Agency Project Headquarters. Maximum holddown is maintained on the mission track and on general knowledge that a mission is in fact in progress. Upon completion of the mission, the community is made aware of results via the Talent System.

13 October 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs**

**SUBJECT : Command and Control Responsibility for
Cuban U-2 Reconnaissance**

1. In accordance with what I have been informed are the President's wishes, expressed through the Acting Chairman, Special Group (5412), I have taken immediate steps to ensure that full command and control responsibility for Cuban U-2 reconnaissance flights is transferred at once from the CIA to SAC, effective 12 October 1962. The full assets of the Agency in the U-2 field have already been placed at SAC's disposal to support their new responsibilities, including providing to SAC our J-75 equipped U-2's.

2. However, in the light of considerable practical experience gained by CIA in successfully conducting more than sixty Cuban U-2 flights periodically since 1960, and because of the mechanical and operational differences between the J-75 equipped U-2's CIA has and the J-57 equipped U-2's possessed by SAC, as well as because of significant differences between SAC's operating techniques and our own, I am obliged to record my essential opposition to the extreme rapidity with which this changeover of command control is being accomplished at a time when the criticality of these missions is so high.

3. At this time, the only pilot in SAC with even minimal qualifications in the J-75 is now being given expedited conversion training to the Agency's J-75 model aircraft in our Detachment at Edwards AFB. This officer is being trained in accordance with Agency standards. As of this date, it is our considered opinion that this officer cannot be considered

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qualified in the J-75 in accordance with Agency standards for an operational mission as early as Sunday, 14 October. A follow-on capability of SAC for continuous full-scale U-2 reconnaissance flights on a daily basis does not now exist.

4. I am in full agreement with the necessary and desirable change in the cover story -- my objection is to the interpretation that this change required an immediate and complete disruption of well-established operating procedures. We will continue to give our full support to SAC for these missions. In my view, however, the precipitate changeover of command responsibility with its attendant risks without adequate preparation and advance planning, as well as evaluation of the consequences, is not in the best interests of achieving our intelligence objectives.

5. Attached is a memorandum for your signature directing the accomplishment of these actions which, to date, have been communicated to me only orally by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

Attachment

Drafted by: DAD/OSA/JCunningham

Final form: DDCI/MSD:blp 13 Oct 62

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee w/atts *Handcarried by General Carter*
Copy #3 - Deputy Secretary Gilpatric w/att *13 Oct*
Copy #4 - DCI w/att *Handcarried by courier*
Copy #5 - DDCI w/att *13 Oct*
Copy #6 - DD/R w/att
Copy #7 - DAD/OSA w/att
Copy #8 - DD/I w/att

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**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

12 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Reconnaissance Overflights of Cuba

1. In view of the changing international situation and in the light of the recommendations of the Special Group (5412), the President has directed that the responsibility, to include command and control and operational decisions, with regard to U-2 reconnaissance overflights of Cuba is transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of Defense, effective this date.

2. You will render all appropriate support and assistance to the agency designated by the Department of Defense as having the responsibility for these missions.

McGeorge Bundy

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TOP SECRET

October 13, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

✓ THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

In the light of the extensive discussions which have been conducted in recent days with respect to the responsibility for a particular reconnaissance operation authorized by higher authority on October 9th, I wish to record my own view of the present situation and of appropriate further procedures. In the light of the views of those with direct recollection of opinions of higher authority who are present in Washington, it seems to me right that responsibility for this particular operation which has been authorized should now be vested in the Department of Defense, and it is the understanding of all concerned that this responsibility now rests with that department. I have been assured by the Acting Director of CIA that all of his people are being instructed to cooperate in every way. At the same time, we must all recognize that there is here a deep and honest difference of opinion not only about the wisdom of this particular decision but also in the best way of proceeding in the future. Accordingly, it is my judgment that the assignment of responsibility for this operation should not be regarded as a binding precedent and that the whole question of roles and responsibilities in this area should be reviewed by the appropriate special group and presented to higher authority for decision when further authorizations are requested.

McGeorge Bundy

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